Bitly l.ead.me Links - l.ead.me is a

legitimate redirection domain. However, it contains user content.

This domain serves as a QR code link and redirection service from Bitly.

Anyone can use Bitly to generate a QR code with a Bitly-hosted "l.ead.me" link to point at a URL of their choosing. Links from "l.ead.me" are present in many QR codes in commercial campaigns and physical products.

A QR code can comprise a variety of content but most of them contain a URL that when scanned by a user on their phone, takes them to the intended website or app.

Bitly does not own QR codes, and does not have the exclusivity of their generation, hosting or redirection. They own the creative and persuasive domain construction of "l.ead.me" that they use to market their QR code generation and link redirection services.

QR codes are not a finite resource. They are not registered and there is no central authority to control their creation. They are generated by encoding the content into a unique, graphical, high-density, standards-compliant and machine-readable representation.

A QR code is more opaque than a text URL — the image provides no trust signals, and phone cameras normally just highlight the domain when pointing at a QR code. Given this, QR codes are advantageous for marketers and advertisers because not only are QR codes easier and quicker for users to get to a desired campaign page, but they can also include attribution and tracking parameters (e.g. the source being a newspaper and its print date). This is because the QR code link can be any URL and can be an unreasonable length because the user doesn’t have to type it in (and wouldn’t either).

Links on "l.ead.me" should not be inherently trusted — anyone can register a new short link on this domain to point to wherever they want. Malicious actors use this service to obscure the true destination to platforms and users. Only after all after redirections, can trust be gauged by inspecting the final destination. Bitly has anti-fraud systems and trust-safety teams, but their mechanisms are mostly reactive, not proactive, and they tend to be too slow to respond in many cases.

As links are user-created and user-managed, and as they send other users to any URL on the web, the links and destinations are user content territory. This domain therefore hosts user content and cannot be fully trusted. It should be considered a legitimate domain because it is widespread, and can redirect to trusted and untrusted destinations. The final destination is the font of trust and it is this final URL that should be checked to determine safety.

With the domain "l.ead.me", the "l" is a self-managed subdomain on the ICANN-jurisdiction domain "ead.me", registered by Bitly. It is a creative domain construction (domain hack) to facilitate a domain that reads as 'lead me', because the domain "lead•me" was likely not available and considered prohibitively expensive to purchase from its owner.

The "l.ead.me" domain seems trustworthy for the user to scan since it reads as a call to action. The link does not confer the final destination — it just indicates the entry point, before redirection. Malicious usage has been documented. Trust should be determined on the final destination. The offered QR code generator for this domain also permits an image to be placed inside the QR code (which works because QR codes have extensive error correction). Some legitimate companies use their logo to improve the perceived trust value of the QR code; but again, a logo does not confer real trust and can be manipulated by malicious actors; the final destination is the marker of trust.

The long-term danger with redirector domains like "l.ead.me" is that the majority of users’ individual experience with these domains will be probabilistically trustworthy while using an opaque and uncertain entry point. They scan a code and order their food. Tomorrow they scan a code and buy their parking ticket. And so on. All legitimate cases that build trust with the user. The more times they see "l.ead.me" with positive outcomes (which is likely on balance), the more likely they are to trust the next time they see "l.ead.me". But a malicious link can appear at any time. Trust should not be reinforced in these domains over time; the final destination should be the crucial indicator of trust to the user.

When checking a "l.ead.me" link with Epi, Epi processes all redirects and checks the final destination. The main result returned is not for the initial link or its intermediaries but the trust determination of the final destination. If the result is one of trusted, for fuller safety, Epi’s provided 'visit' button should be used as it takes the user straight to the final destination, avoiding the possibility of redirects changing and taking the user to a malicious location.